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When National Territory is Home
to the Global: Old Borders
to Novel Borderings
SASKIA SASSEN
One angle into the question of national territory, at a time of global and digital
capabilities, is the border. It is one of the critical national institutions that those
capabilities can unsettle and even neutralise. Borders, in turn, bring up the national
state as the key historic actor shaped partly by the struggle about and institutiona-
lising of territorial borders. The globalisation of a broad range of processes is pro-
ducing ruptures in the mosaic of border regimes underlying the international
system of exclusive territorial demarcations. There is much disagreement about
the effect of these global and digital capabilities on state territorial jurisdictions,
with some seeing much and others little real change.1 But both sides of the
debate tend to share one assumption, often implicit: the territorial exclusivity of
the nation-state which makes of the border a line that divides the national and
the global into two mutually exclusive domains.
And yet, the changes under way are shifting the meaning of borders, even when
the actual geographic lines that demarcate territories have not been altered.
Perhaps more importantly, these changes are contributing to the formation of
new types of borders. Such changed meanings and new types of borders make
legible the fact that bordering takes place in far more sites than geographic border-
lines and their linked institutions, such as consulates and airport immigration
controls. And they make legible the extent of state capture in the historiography
and geography covering the geopolitics of the last two centuries, an issue that
has received considerable attention in the last few years.2
The organising argument in this article is that we are seeing the incipient for-
mation of a type of bordering capability and state practice regarding its territory
that entail a partial denationalising of what has been constructed historically as
national and hence an unsettling of the meaning of geographic borders. Critical
to this argument is the thesis that global processes also take place at subnational
levels,3 hereby disrupting the notion of mutually exclusive domains for the
national and the global. Much attention in the scholarship has gone to the loss
of functions by states to supranational, global and private entities.4 Much less
attention has gone to the thesis that state territorial authority is being affected
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by the proliferation of subnational scalings of global processes and institutions.
When we conceive of globalisation as partly enacted at various subnational
scales and institutional domains we can posit the possibility of a proliferation of
borderings inside national territories. The thesis organising this article is that econ-
omic globalisation is in fact a politico-economic system partly located inside
national states; as a result, we see: a) a partial, often highly specialised and
hence obscure, denationalising of specific components of state work, the
economy, society and the polity; and b) that the specialised transnational
regimes being implemented to govern global processes also enter national insti-
tutional space and geographic territory,5 and that both of these dynamics
(a and b) produce a variety of novel borderings inside national territory which
often can function in ways unaffected by the continuing geographic demarcation
of state territories.6 A focus on such bordering capabilities allows us to see
something about territory and space that is easily obscured in the more prevalent
analyses which assume the mutual exclusivity of the national and the global.
First, I will examine the main lines of the debate about the state and the question
of borders and exclusive territorial authority. Next, I will examine the question of
global processes at the subnational level to get at the thesis that concerns me here:
the partial unbundling of traditional territorial national borders and the formation
of new bordering capabilities.7 Finally, I will discuss borders and new bordering
capabilities and the kinds of theoretical and research issues they bring to the scho-
larly agenda.
National territories and global processes
There have been many epochs when territories were subject to several systems of
rule. In this regard the current condition we see developing with globalisation is
probably by far the more common one and the more exceptional period is the
one that has seen the strengthening of the national state. The gradual institutional
tightening of the national state’s exclusive authority over its territory took off
particularly after the First World War in most of the developed countries. So did
the elaboration of the categories for analysis, research techniques and data-sets
in the social sciences that refined the national state perspective. Accommodating
the possibility of multiple relations between territory and institutional encasement,
rather than the singular one of national territory and sovereign rule, requires theor-
etical and empirical specifications – a collective task well under way.
The multiple regimes that constitute the border as an institution can be grouped
into a formalised apparatus that is part of the interstate system. The first has at its
core the body of regulations covering a variety of international flows – flows of
different types of commodities, capital, people, services and information. No
matter their variety, these multiple regimes tend to cohere around: a) the state’s
unilateral authority to define and enforce regulations, and b) the state’s obligation
to respect and uphold the regulations coming out of the international treaty system
or out of bilateral arrangements.8 While never fully effective, today this formal-
ised apparatus is not only partly being unbundled, but also confronts an emerging,
still far less formalised, array of novel types of borderings lying largely outside the
framing of the interstate system. Further, this emergent array of borderings does
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not necessarily entail a self-evident crossing of borders; it includes a range of
dynamics arising out of specific contemporary developments, notably emergent
global law systems and a growing range of globally networked digital interactive
domains.
The national state capture in these modes of analysis has had the effect of sim-
plifying the question of the border: the border is largely reduced to a geographic
event and the immediate institutional apparatus through which it is controlled,
protected and generally governed. What globalisation brings to this condition is
the actual and heuristic disaggregating of ‘the border’ typically represented as a
unitary condition in policy discourse and making legible its multiple components.
The globalisation of a broad range of processes shows us that the ‘border’ can
extend deep into national territory and is constituted through many more insti-
tutions and has many more locations than is suggested by standard representations.
These globalising processes also help make legible the features and the condition-
alities of what has been the dominant border regime, associated with the nation-
state, which though still the prevalent border regime of our times is now less so
than it was even 15 years ago.
Globalisation thus engages the territory of the state, and thereby inevitably the
question of state borders. One of the critical literatures for these issues and the
main lines of debate, even when not directly addressed, is that of the state and glo-
balisation. In many ways the issues that concern me here are addressed indirectly
or obliquely, because the framing in the literature is rather more like a tug of war
given assumptions of mutual exclusivity – what one wins, the other loses. For the
purposes of this article it is worth examining the assumptions that are made on
each side of the debate, even when the actual question of the border is often not
central. To repeat, most marked is the fact that both sides basically take for
given the fact of the border as demarcating mutual exclusivity.
This scholarship is large and growing, and by now increasingly familiar. Very
briefly, and simplifying, we can identify two major strands. For some, states
remain as the key actors and hence not much has changed for states and the inter-
state system, each state enjoying mutually recognised territorial borders.9 For
others, even if states remain important there are today other key actors who are
accumulating rights and powers to cross those borders.10 Some see these as new
actors; others do not and rather emphasise the weakening of their powers alongside
the strengthening of national states over the last 100 years.11 Even if we accept that
the present era is, at a very general level, a continuation of a long history of
changes that have not altered the fundamental fact of state primacy, it still
demands detailed research about the specificities of the current changes.
Focusing on the formation of novel bordering capabilities brings to the fore par-
ticular aspects of territory and space that are easily overlooked.12 Unlike analyses
of private authority which emphasise the shift out of the public domain and into
the private domain,13 no doubt a critical dimension,14 here I seek to detect the pre-
sence of private agendas and authority inside the public domain of the state.15 This
can go further to an emphasis on the privatisation of norm-making capacities:
these capacities were once in the public domain, but today they have become
private and use the public domain to enact private norms.16 This perspective
thus also differs from a literature that emphasises the decline and obsolescence
Old Borders to Novel Borderings
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of the state.17 It comes close to the scholarship that emphasises state trans-
formations,18 even though this literature tends to discard the specificity of the
current phase of globalisation.19
One of my efforts here is, then, to blur some longstanding dualities in state
scholarship, notably, those concerning the distinctive spheres of influence of
respectively the national and the global, of state and non-state actors, and of the
private and the public.20 While it may indeed be the case that mostly the two
sides of the duality are separate and mutually exclusive, I argue for the critical
importance of recognising and deciphering conditions or components that do
not fit in this dual structure. Borders and novel bordering capacities then function
as a heuristic to detect deeper transformations.21 An important methodological
assumption here is that focusing on economic globalisation can help us disentan-
gle some of these issues precisely because, in strengthening the legitimacy of
claims by foreign investors and firms and the legitimate authority of international
regimes inside the country, it renders visible the work of accommodating these
rights and authorities in what remain basically national economies and national
polities.22
The embeddedness of the global requires at least a partial lifting of national
encasements and hence signals a necessary participation by the state, even when
it concerns the state’s own withdrawal from regulating the economy. Does the
weight of private, often foreign, interests in this specific work of the state
become constitutive of a particular form of state authority that does not replace
but works alongside older well-established forms of state authority?23 My argu-
ment is that the mix of processes we describe as globalisation is indeed producing,
deep inside the national state, a very partial but significant form of authority,
a hybrid that is neither fully private nor fully public, neither fully national nor
fully global.24
As states participate in the implementation of cross border regimes, whether the
global economic system or the international human rights regime, they have
undergone at times significant transformations because this accommodation
entails a negotiation. In the case of the global economy, this negotiation entails
the development inside national states – through legislative acts, court rulings,
executive orders, policy – of the mechanisms necessary for the reconstitution
of certain components of national capital into ‘global capital’, and necessary to
develop and ensure new types of rights/entitlements for foreign capital25 in
what are still national territories in principle under the exclusive authority of
their states.26
National borders and subnational scalings of the global
As particular components of national states become the institutional home for the
operation of some of the dynamics that are central to globalisation, they undergo
change that is difficult to register or name. This is one instantiation of what I call a
process of incipient denationalisation. This partial, often highly specialised or at
least particularised, denationalisation can also take place in domains other than
that of economic globalisation, notably, the more recent developments in the
human rights regime which increasingly make it possible for a plaintiff in a
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given country to sue a firm27 (and even a dictator) in that country’s courts. Another
instance is the use of human rights instruments to grant undocumented immigrants
certain rights. Denationalisation is, thus, multivalent: it endogenises global
agendas of many different types of actors, not only corporate firms and financial
markets, but also human rights objectives.
The question for research then becomes: what is actually ‘national’ in some of
the institutional components of states linked to the implementation and regulation
of economic globalisation? The hypothesis here would be that some components
of national institutions, even though formally national, are not national in the sense
in which we have constructed the meaning of that term over the last hundred years.
One of the roles of the state vis-a`-vis today’s global economy has been to negotiate
the intersection of national law and foreign actors – whether firms, markets or
supranational organisations. This raises a question as to whether there are particu-
lar conditions that make execution of this role in the current phase distinctive and
unlike what it may have been in earlier phases of the world economy.
We need to understand more about the nature of this engagement than is
represented by concepts such as deregulation. It is becoming clear that the role
of the state in the process of deregulation involves the production of a series
of instruments that grant foreign actors and international regimes rights to the
territory of the state in a way that represents a rupture with the history of the
last hundred years. This is also evident in the proliferation of specialised, often
semi-autonomous regulatory agencies and the specialised crossborder networks
they are forming which are taking over functions once enclosed in national
legal frameworks.28 One way of conceptualising this is to posit that these instru-
ments produce new types of borders deep inside the territory of the national state.
They do not shift the geographic line that demarcates the ‘border’ recognised in
international treaties. But they do produce new borders and they do change the
institutional apparatus that gives meaning to the geographic border.
Critical here is that processes that do not necessarily scale at the global level as
such can be part of globalisation. These processes take place deep inside territories
and institutional domains that have largely been constructed in national terms in
much, though by no means all, of the world. What makes these processes part
of globalisation, even though localised in national, indeed subnational settings,
is that they involve transboundary networks and formations connecting or articu-
lating multiple local or ‘national’ processes and actors.29 Among these processes
I include particular aspects of the work of states, such as specific monetary and
fiscal policies critical to the constitution of global markets – which are thus
being implemented in a growing number of countries as these become integrated
into global markets.30 Other instances are crossborder networks of activists
engaged in specific localised struggles with an explicit or implicit global agenda,
as is the case with many human rights and environmental organisations; non-
cosmopolitan forms of global politics and imaginaries that remain deeply attached
or focused on localised issues and struggles and yet are also part of global lateral
networks containing multiple other such localised efforts. A particular challenge
in the work of identifying these types of processes and actors as part of globalisa-
tion is the need to decode at least some of what continues to be experienced and
represented as national.
Old Borders to Novel Borderings
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Important to the argument in this article is the thesis that these types of nation-
based practices and dynamics can be conceptualised as constitutive of global
scalings we do not usually recognise as such. This brings to the fore internal
and novel borderings produced in the encounter between a global process –
whether economic, cultural, political or subjective – and existing thick national
environments. This encounter can assume many different shapes and contents.
It can be a highly charged event with multiple individual, institutional and/or
structural contestations, victories and retreats on each side. Or it can be a highly
specialised insertion noticeable directly only within that specialised domain, as
might be the case with some of the new standards in finance and accounting.
The research needed to get at these types of issues can vary enormously depend-
ing on the content (political, economic, cultural or subjective) and on location
(institutional, structural, demographic, subjective, and so on). Yet cutting across
this variability is the need to distinguish: a) the various scales constituted
through global processes, ranging from supranational and global to subnational
and translocal;31 and b) the specific sites of a given object of study in this
multi-scalar globalisation.32 Geography more than any other of the social sciences
today has contributed to a critical stance toward scale, recognising the historicity
of scales and resisting the reification of the national scale so present in most of
social science.
This in turn brings up a critical conceptual task: the need to decode particular
aspects of what is still represented or experienced as ‘national’ which may in fact
have shifted away from what had historically been considered or constituted as
national. This is in many ways a research and theorisation logic that is the same
as that developed in the economics of global city studies. But, while a growing
number of scholars today have come around to recognise and code global city
functions as part of the global, this cannot be said for a range of other subnational
instances of the global still coded and represented as local and national.
Three types of cases serve to illustrate some of the conceptual, methodological
and empirical issues in these types of studies aimed at detecting the global inside
the national, signalling the existence of novel types of borderings. One of these
concerns the role of place in many of the circuits constitutive of economic and pol-
itical globalisation. A focus on places allows us to unbundle globalisation in terms
of the multiple specialised crossborder circuits on which different types of places
are located.33 Yet another example is that of global cities as subnational places
where multiple global circuits intersect and thereby position these cities on
several structured crossborder geographies, each typically with distinct scopes
and constituted in terms of distinct practices and actors.34 This type of analysis
produces a different picture of globalisation from one centred on global firms
and markets, international trade, or the pertinent supranational institutions. It is
not that one type of focus is better than the other, but rather that the latter
focus, the most common focus by far, is not enough.
A second type of case, partly involved in that described above, is the role of the
new interactive technologies in repositioning the local, thereby inviting us to a
critical examination of how we conceptualise the local. Through these new tech-
nologies a financial services firm becomes a micro-environment with continuous
global span. But so do resource-poor organisations or households; they can also
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become micro-environments with global span, as might be the case with activist
organisations. These micro-environments can be oriented to other such micro-
environments located far away, thereby destabilising both the notion of context
which is often imbricated with that of the local and the notion that physical proxi-
mity is one of the attributes or markers of the local. A critical reconceptualisation
of the local along these lines entails at least a partial rejection of the notion that
local scales are inevitably part of nested hierarchies of scale running from the
local to the regional, the national and the international.35
A third type of case concerns a specific set of interactions between global
dynamics and particular components of national states. The crucial conditionality
here is the partial embeddedness of the global in the national, of which the global
city is perhaps emblematic. My main argument here is that, in so far as specific
structurations of the global inhabit what has historically been constructed and
institutionalised as national territory, this engenders a variety of negotiations.
One set of outcomes evident today is what I describe as an incipient, highly
specialised and partial denationalisation of specific components of national states.
In all three instances the question of scaling takes on very specific contents in
that these are practices and dynamics that pertain to the constituting of the global,
yet are taking place at what has been historically constructed as the scale of the
national. With few exceptions, most prominently among which is a growing
scholarship in geography, the social sciences have not had critical distance, that
is, historicised the scale of the national. The consequence has been a tendency
to take it as a fixed scale, reifying it, and, more generally, to neutralise the question
of scaling, or at best to reduce scaling to a hierarchy of size. Associated with this
tendency is also the often uncritical assumption that these scales are mutually
exclusive, most pertinently for my argument here, that the scale of the national
is mutually exclusive with that of the global. A qualifying variant which allows
for mutual imbrications, though of a very limited sort, can be seen when scaling
is conceived of as a nested hierarchy.36
National borders and subnational borderings
The three cases described above go against those assumptions and propositions
that are now often captured through the concept of methodological nationalism.
But they do so in a distinct way. Crucial to the existing body of work representing
a critique of methodological nationalism is the need for transnationalism: the
nation as container category is inadequate given the proliferation of dynamics
and formations that go beyond the nation-state.37 What I am focusing on here is
a set of reasons other than transnationalism for supporting the critique of methodo-
logical nationalism: the fact of multiple and specific structurations of the global
inside what has historically been constructed as national. In many ways I focus
on the other end of the transnationalism dynamic: I look inside the national.
Along these lines, I find that Xiangming Chen’s recent work also captures this
particular combination.38 Further, I posit that, because the national is highly insti-
tutionalised and thick, structurations of the global inside the national entail a
partial, typically highly specialised and specific denationalisation of particular
components of the national. This approach, then, is a critique of methodological
Old Borders to Novel Borderings
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nationalism, but its starting point is not exclusively predicated on the fact of
transnationalism, rather bringing in the possibility of internal denationalisation.
One analytic pathway into this bundle of empirical and conceptual issues is to
disaggregate state-centred border regimes and to locate a given site in a global web
of bordered spaces. One of the key analytic distinctions to be made is that between
the ongoing presence of border regimes centred in the state and the interstate
system and the emergence of the types of novel borderings associated with the
multiplication of subnational global scalings discussed above.
State-centred border regimes have also undergone significant change even as
they remain part of older formalisations, such as international treaties. Globalisa-
tion, neoliberal supranational regimes and new forms of private authority have all
affected old border regimes.39 The outcome is that we see a great diversity of
institutional locations even among state-centred regimes. For instance, cross-
border flows of capital will require a sequence of interventions that move deep
inside the national institutional apparatus, and also differ in character from that
of traded goods, for example. The actual geographic border crossing is part of
the crossborder flow of goods, but not necessarily of capital, except if actual
cash is being transported. Each border-control intervention point can be conceived
of as one site in a chain of locations. In the case of traded goods these might
involve a pre-border inspection or certification site. In the case of capital flows
the chain of locations will involve banks, stock markets and electronic networks.
The financial and the trade bordering functions each contain specific institutional
and geographic locations, increasingly including some internal to the nation-state.
The geographic borderline is but one point in the chain; institutional points of
border control intervention can form long chains inside the country.
One image we might use to capture this notion of multiple locations is that the
sites for the enforcement of border regimes range from banks to bodies. When a
bank executes the most elementary money transfer to another country, the bank
is one of the sites for border-regime enforcement. A certified good represents a
case where the object itself crossing the border is one of the sites for enforcement:
the emblematic case is a certified agricultural product. But it also encompasses the
case of the tourist carrying a tourist visa and the immigrant carrying the requisite
certification. Indeed, in the case of immigration, it is the body of the immigrant
herself which is both the carrier of much of the regime and the crucial site for
enforcement; and in the case of an unauthorised immigrant, it is, again, the
body of the immigrant that is the carrier of the violation of the law and of the
corresponding punishment (such as detention or expulsion).
A direct effect of globalisation, especially corporate economic globalisation,
has been to create increasing divergence among different border regimes. In
some cases these divergences are the effect of enormous specialisation and
remain rather obscure; in other cases they are quite elementary. One familiar
instance that captures some of this is the lifting of border controls on a growing
variety of capital, services and information flows alongside ongoing and even
strengthened closure in other border regimes, for example the migration of
low-wage workers. We are also seeing the construction of specific ‘borderings’
to contain and govern emerging, often strategic or specialised, flows that cut
across traditional national borders, as is the case, for instance, with the new
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regimes in the North American Free Trade Association and the General Agree-
ment of Tariffs and Trade for the crossborder circulation of high-level pro-
fessionals.40 Where in the past these professionals may have been part of a
country’s general immigration regime, now we have an increasing divergence
between the latter and the specialised regime governing professionals.
In what follows I examine briefly some of the key analytic distinctions we
might use in researching these emergent questions about national territory, old
borders and novel types of borderings inside national territory. First, I discuss
what it might mean to study a subnational site as part of global processes and
hence to recognise the formation of novel types of bordering. Next, and to
conclude, I focus on the larger issues of territory and state authority raised at
the beginning of this article by examining some novel types of bordering dynamics
as these intersect with the national territorial authority of the state, particularly the
destabilised meaning of conventional borders under the impact of multiple forms
of globalisation.
Positioning a site in a global web of borders
If we were to consider what might be involved in locating an economic site in a
global web of ‘borders’ a first step in my research practice is to conceive of the
global economy as constituted through: a) a set of specialised/partial circuits,
and b) multiple, often overlapping, space economies. The question then becomes
how a given area is articulated with various circuits and space economies.
The articulation of a site with global circuits can be direct or indirect, and part
of long or short chains. An instance of a direct articulation would be a site located
on a specialised global circuit, as might be the case with export forestry, a mine,
offshore manufacturing or offshore banking. An instance of an indirect articulation
might be a site located on national economic circuits, such as a site for the pro-
duction of processed consumer goods where exports happen through multiple
complex national and foreign urban markets. The chains of transactions involved
in these different types of products are likely to be shorter in the case of extractive
industries than in manufacturing, especially in consumer goods where export/
import handlers and multiple distributors are likely to be part of the chain.
As for the second element, the space economies involved, a first critical issue is
that a given site can be constituted through one or more space economies. A for-
estry site or an agricultural site is likely to be constituted through fewer space
economies than a financial centre or a manufacturing complex. Secondly, none,
only one, or several might be global space economies. It seems to me crucial to
disaggregate a site along these lines, and not reify an area. For instance, the
space economy even of a sparsely populated area, such as a forestry site, can be
far more complex than common sense might suggest: even if it is located on
only one global circuit: such as an international logging company that has con-
tracted for all the wood produced in the site. That logging multinational’s acqui-
sition of the wood requires it also to satisfy a great mix of requirements typically
executed via specialised corporate services, notably accounting and law, and it is
likely to require financing, in turn subject to national regulations.
Old Borders to Novel Borderings
531
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Vr
ij
e 
Un
iv
er
si
te
it
, 
Li
br
ar
y]
 A
t:
 1
1:
18
 1
 J
un
e 
20
11
We might then say that the forestry site is actually constituted through several
space economies, and at the least two: logging and specialised corporate services.
But it is likely to be part of a third space economy, that of global financial markets.
For instance, if the logging company is part of a stock exchange listing, it may well
have ‘liquefied’ the logs by converting them into derivatives that can then circulate
as financial instruments in the global capital market.41 This insertion in global
financial markets is to be distinguished from the financing of, in this case, the
actual work of logging; it has, rather, to do with the capabilities of global
finance today to liquefy even the most immobile material good, such as real
estate, so it may circulate as a profit-making financial instrument in the global
capital market, in addition to the profit-making potential of the material good
itself.
There is a kind of analytics that emerges out of the particularity of this discus-
sion of state-centred border regimes and the empirical work of locating a site that
is part of a global web of such state-centred border regimes. These are analytics
that aim at disaggregating the border function into the character, locations and
sites for enforcement of a given border regime. The effect is to make legible the
multiple territorial, spatial and institutional dimensions of ‘the border’.
Disembedding the border from its national encasements
A critical and growing component of the broader field of forces within which
states operate today is the proliferation of specialised types of private authority.
These include the expansion of older systems, such as commercial arbitration,
into new economic sectors, and they include new forms of private authority that
are highly specialised and oriented towards specific economic sectors, such as
the system of rules governing the international operations of large construction
and engineering firms.
One outcome of key aspects of these various trends is the emergence of a stra-
tegic field of operations that represents a partial disembedding of specific border-
ing operations from the broader institutional world of the state geared to national
agendas. It is a fairly rarefied field of crossborder transactions aimed at addressing
the new conditions produced and demanded by economic globalisation. The trans-
actions are strategic, cut across borders, and entail specific interactions among
private actors and, some times, government agencies or officials. They do not
entail the state as such, as in international treaties, for these transactions consist
of the operations and aims of private actors – in this case, mostly firms and
markets aiming at globalising their operations. These are transactions that cut
across borders in that they concern the standards and regulations imposed on
firms and markets operating globally; in so doing, these transactions push
towards convergence at the level of national regulations and law aimed at creating
the requisite conditions for globalisation.
There are two distinct features about this field of transactions that lead me to
posit that we can conceive of it as a disembedded space that is in the process of
getting structured. One of these features is that, while operating in familiar set-
tings – the state and interstate system for officials and agencies of governments
and the supranational system and the ‘private sector’ for non-state economic
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actors – the practices of these agents are constituting a distinct field that assembles
bits of territory, authority and rights into new types of specialised and typically
highly particularised structures. The field of practices getting constituted cannot
be confined to the institutional world of the interstate system. The second
feature is the proliferation of rules that begin to assemble into partial, specialised
systems of law. Here we enter a whole new domain of private authorities –
fragmented, specialised, increasingly formalised, but not running through national
law per se. The implications of this proliferation of specialised, mostly private or
supranational systems of law, is that they signal the destabilising of conventional
understandings of national borders.
One perhaps extreme instance that captures current processes that disembed the
national border from its national encasements is the formation of multiple, albeit
very partial, global law systems.42 Over the last two decades we have seen a mul-
tiplication of crossborder systems of rule that evince variable autonomy from
national law. At one end are systems clearly centred in what is emerging as a trans-
national public domain and, at the other, systems that are completely autonomous
and are largely private. Some scholars see in this development an emergent global
law. We might conceive of it as a type of law that is disembedded from national
law systems. At the heart of the notion of something akin to global law lies the
possibility of a law that, firstly, is not centred in national law, unlike international
law today, and, secondly, that goes beyond the project of harmonising the different
national laws, which is the case with much of the supranational system developed
to address economic globalisation, environmental issues and human rights. There
is, in fact, a rapid growth over the last decades of such autonomous, highly differ-
entiated systems of rules, some connected to the supranational system but not
centred in national law, and others privatised and autonomous.
There is disagreement as to the notion itself of global law. Some scholars have
long argued that there is no such entity as global law, though the specifics of their
analysis43might accommodate its presence if they were writing today.44Whatever
the approach, these scholars prefer to conceive of ‘global law’ as a site where mul-
tiple competing national systems interact. For instance, Dezalay and Garth note
that the ‘international’ is itself constituted largely out of a competition among
national approaches.45 Thus the international emerges as a site for regulatory
competition among essentially national approaches, whatever the issue whether
it be environmental protection, constitutionalism or human rights.46 The project
vis-a`-vis the global corporate economy, for example, is then one of harmonising
differences through the specialised branch of law called conflicts law or through
force. Much of the scholarship on global governance comes from this type of
perspective.
For other scholars,47 there is an emerging global law centred in the development
of autonomous partial regimes. The project on ‘International Courts and
Tribunals’ has identified approximately 125 international institutions, in which
independent authorities reach final legal decisions.48 These range from those in
the public domain, such as human rights courts, to those in the private sector.
They function through courts, quasi-courts and other mechanisms for settling
disputes, such as international commercial arbitration.49 They include the inter-
national maritime court, various tribunals for reparations, international criminal
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courts, hybrid international-national tribunal instances, trade and investment
judicial bodies, regional human rights tribunals and convention-derived insti-
tutions, as well as other regional courts, such as the European Court of Justice,
the European Free Trade Association Court and the Benelux Court.50 The
number of private systems has grown sharply in the last decade.
The formation of these novel global regimes is not premised on the integration,
harmonisation or convergence of national legal orders. They also produce, in this
process, novel types of borderings, notably through the juridification of the
regime; this, then, often entails an insertion of a distinctly bordered space into
a national territory marked by its own specific bordering – the conventional
border. In this sense, then, these new regimes go beyond the type of international
economic law, such as those arising out of the Trade-related Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) agreements of the World Trade Organisation involving the com-
munity of member states, which requires states to institute particular regulations
in their national legal systems. Most prominently, Teubner sees a multiplication
of sectoral regimes that is an overlay on national legal systems.51 The outcome
is a foundational transformation of the criteria for differentiating law; not the
law of nations, nor the distinction between private and public, but rather the rec-
ognition of multiple specialised segmented processes of juridification, which
today are largely private. As he put it, ‘societal fragmentation impacts upon law
in a manner such that the political regulation of differentiated societal spheres
requires the parcelling out of issue-specific policy-arenas, which, for their part,
juridify themselves’.52 In this perspective, global law is segmented into transna-
tional legal regimes which define the ‘external reach of their jurisdiction along
issue-specific rather than territorial lines, and which claim a global validity for
themselves’.53
To take a concrete case, a type of private authority that illustrates some –
though by no means all – of these issues can be seen in the so-called lex construc-
tionis. This case combines: a) the notion of an autonomous global system of
rules internal to an economic sector with b) the fact of a few large firms having
disproportionate control over a sector which thereby facilitates the making of
such private systems of rules. It is a combination of rules and standard contracts
for crossborder construction projects. The sector is dominated by a small number
of well organised private associations: the International Federation of Consulting
Engineers, the International European Construction Federation, the British
Institution of Civil Engineers, the Engineering Advancement Association of
Japan and the American Institute of Architects. In addition, the World Bank,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, the International
Institute for the Unification of Private Law and certain international law firms
also contribute to developing legal norms for how the sector is meant to function.
Because of the nature of large construction and engineering projects, this case also
illuminates the ways in which an autonomous system of rules and the type of
power possessed by large global firms does not mean that these firms can
escape all outside constraints. Indeed, these firms increasingly ‘need’ to address
environmental protection. The way this issue gets handled in the lex constructionis
is also emblematic of other such autonomously governed sectors; largely a strat-
egy of deference that aims at externalising the responsibility for regulating the
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environmental issues arising out of large-scale construction projects. The externa-
lising is to the ‘extra-contractual’ realm of the law of the host-state, using
‘compliance’ provisions that are today part of the standard contract.
These and other such transnational institutions and regimes do signal a shift in
authority from the public to the private when it comes to governing the global
economy. They also contain a shift in the capacity for norm-making and, in that
regard, raise questions about changes in the relation between state sovereignty
and the governance of global economic processes. International commercial arbi-
tration is basically a private justice system, credit rating agencies are private gate-
keeping systems, and the lex constructionis is a self-regulatory regime in a major
economic sector dominated by a limited number of large firms. Along with other
such institutions, they have emerged as important governance mechanisms whose
authority is not centred in the state. Each is a bordered system – a key condition-
ality for its effectiveness and validity. But the bordering capability is not part of
national state borders.
Conclusions
State sovereignty is usually conceived of as a monopoly of authority over a par-
ticular territory. Today, it is becoming evident that national territories may
remain demarcated along the same old geographic borderlines, but that novel
types of borderings resulting from globalisation are increasingly present inside
national territory. Sovereignty remains as a systemic property, yet its institutional
insertion and its capacity to legitimate and absorb all legitimating power have
become unstable. The politics of contemporary sovereignties is far more
complex than notions of mutually exclusive territories can capture.
The question of a bordered exclusive territory as a parameter for authority and
rights has today entered a new phase. While the exclusive territorial authority of
the state remains prevalent, the constitutive regimes are today less absolute than
they were once meant to be. In this sense, then, state-centred border regimes –
whether open or closed – remain foundational elements in our geopolity, but
they coexist with a variety of other bordering dynamics and capabilities.
This does not mean that states are simply losing some putative battle against
global forces. In so far as the state has historically had the capability to encase
its territory through administrative and legal instruments, it also has the capability
to change that encasement – for instance, deregulate its borders and open up to
foreign firms and investment. But, I argued here, this comes with some founda-
tional changes, particularly the partial denationalising of what was once national.
This in turn points to the formation of novel types of bordering in the encounter of
the global and the national inside national territory.
One critical aspect of this emergent research agenda is to study the global not
only in terms of that which is explicitly global in scale, but also in terms of prac-
tices and institutions that scale at subnational levels. Further, it entails recognising
that many of the globally scaled dynamics, such as the global capital market,
actually are partly embedded in subnational sites and move between these differ-
ently scaled practices and organisational forms. For instance, the global capital
market is constituted both through electronic markets with global span and
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through locally embedded conditions, such as financial centres and all they entail,
from infrastructure to systems of trust.
A focus on such subnationally based processes and dynamics of globalisation
requires methodologies and theorisations that engage not only global scalings
but also subnational scalings as components of global processes, thereby destabi-
lising older hierarchies of scale and conceptions of nested scalings. Studying
global processes and conditions that get constituted subnationally has some advan-
tages over studies of globally scaled dynamics; but it also poses specific chal-
lenges. It does make possible the use of longstanding research techniques, from
quantitative to qualitative, in the study of globalisation. It also gives us a bridge
for using the wealth of national and subnational data-sets, as well as specialised
scholarships such as area studies. Both types of studies, however, need to be situ-
ated in conceptual architectures that are not quite those held by the researchers
who originally generated these research techniques and data-sets, since their
efforts have mostly had little to do with globalisation.
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